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OVERVIEW AND MACROECONOMIC ISSUES
LESSONS FROM THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
EXPERIENCE OF SOUTH KOREA
By Danny Leipziger
 
Abstract
The paper reviews some of the key aspects leading to Korea’s remarkably successful economic transformation, including 
its consistent and aggressive pursuit of export-led growth, its investments in basic services and housing, its enviable 
record in human capital development and skills acquisition, its regional development policies, its strengths in planning and 
implementation, and its concerns about societal issues like equitable growth. The second part of the paper looks at some of 
Korea’s challenges for the future. In this area, some concerns are raised about demographic constraints, the alarming increase 
in household debt and dearth of household savings, issues of energy policy, trends in the distribution of income and wealth, 
and a possible need for institutional revitalization. The aim of any reforms is to position Korea well for the future and to 
maintain its economic position and the wellbeing of its citizens.
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Introduction
Korea’s economic success has created a large industry of 
researchers who have attempted to explain and extol the virtues 
of Korea’s economic rise. These efforts have also led to attempts 
at generalizing lessons and providing advice to other countries. 
Of course, these lessons fall into two groups: those that are very 
specific to Korea’s economic situation and circumstances and 
those that are less intrinsically connected. Even in the latter 
group of factors, however, there must be recognition that policy 
formulation is only part of the story and that implementation 
plays an even larger role than the design of smart policies. Even 
those countries attempting to undertake efficacious policies 
may fail due to institutional weaknesses. Hence, there is a lot to 
learn from the development experience of South Korea.
Rather than dwell on some of the better known policy areas, 
however, that have been amply explored, such as the export-
driven growth model, the chaebol-led industrialization path 
and the use of subsidized credit, or the repatriation of skilled 
professionals and adaptation of high-end technologies, in this 
essay the focus will be on aspects of economic policy that can 
be seen as inclusive. In other words, we will concentrate on 
those policies that led to broadly shared economic growth and 
wholesale improvements in the well-being of a large swath of 
the population. Formerly dubbed equitable growth and more 
recently inclusive growth, the point is that economic growth 
without a sharing of gains leads to exploitive societies and 
minimal welfare gains for the majority of the population. 
This Korean experience of inclusive development is highly 
relevant today in light of the attention drawn to increasingly 
skewed distributions of income and wealth in many developed 
and emerging market economies. Given the evidence that many 
non-inclusive economic outcomes can be self-perpetuating 
since economic opportunities are limited and economic power 
perverting, it is even more instructive to learn about the way 
in which income gains were shared in an economy such as 
Korea’s, namely, an economy that grew so phenomenally 
over many decades and escaped the economic devastation and 
rampant poverty that plagues so many other countries.
Six Lessons on Inclusive Growth
First and foremost, the Korean experience shows how the shift 
from an agrarian economy to a manufacturing-led economy 
went hand-in-hand with large-scale productivity gains. The 
W. Arthur Lewis hypothesis about surplus labor was seen in 
reality in the shift to labor-intensive production in 1960s Korea. 
Indeed, even though the process entails copying of production 
methods of more advanced countries like Japan, the efficient 
use of factor endowments, namely basically educated and 
motivated labor, led to large gains in employment, output and 
incomes. Indeed, it was only the vestigial use of subsidies that 
kept the rural labor force from declining even more rapidly 
than it did. The shift to urban settings involved huge gains in 
productivity per worker, and the accumulation of capital and 
use of technology further magnified these gains. The results 
were spectacular, namely, a drop in the rate of absolute poverty 
from close to 30 percent of the population in 1970 to one-third 
that level a decade later. So lesson one was that to increase the 
earnings of workers, one needs to employ them in higher value-
added endeavors, empower them with capital, and enhance 
their productivity with newer technologies. 
New urban work forces can either live in shanty towns, the 
favelas of Brazil and the slums of Lagos, or they can be 
housed in some fashion. Whether it was company housing 
at first or latter on public housing projects, South Korea, 
similar to both Hong Kong and Singapore, decided that 
government-supported housing was an essential ingredient of 
urban development. Inclusive development cannot proceed 
when the poor and the working poor lack assets, and one of 
the key assets in a dynamically growing economy is housing. 
Countries lacking the fiscal resources to provide adequate 
housing will in the end be creating urban sprawl, degradation 
and slums. The inability to provide basic public services, such 
as water and electricity, not only reduces living standards, 
but also creates health problems and fewer opportunities for 
upward mobility. Lesson two, therefore, is for governments 
to invest in public services and to deal with urban housing 
demands in a proactive manner. South Korea did this and 
other East Asian economies ranging from Thailand, Malaysia, 
Vietnam and China have done so as well, with recognized 
successes in distributional measures of income.
Education provides the great equalizing element for societies 
that are concerned with issues of economic opportunity. 
Governments do not always see investments in education as 
being beneficial for the individual household; they often do so 
for larger national economic reasons, such as to create a more 
skilled workforce. Nevertheless, the interests of the public and 
private sectors can overlap as seen in the significant public 
investment in education in South Korea that was matched by 
prodigious private investment by families in the education of 
their children. Researchers often marvel at the high educational 
achievement achieved with modest investment levels (as a 
percentage of GDP). What they fail to appreciate is the investment 
of private monies in education that provided almost as much 
effort as did government in the education challenge. In order to 
promote inclusive or more equitable growth, lesson three is to 
level the playing field with high-quality public education, with 
accountability by the school system and the strong involvement 
of parents. Similar to Finland and Singapore, and others scoring 
well on global examinations, Korean teachers were held in high 
esteem by society and education was seen as a universal goal 
of all those involved. Additionally the high levels of literacy 
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achieved in the 1950s and 1960s provided the building block 
for a trainable workforce. This latter point is critical since a 
rapidly growing economy such as Korea in the 1970-1990 
period witnessed rapid changes in industrial composition, a 
phenomenon requiring a malleable work force. 
Not all urban driven development forces can capture all comers, 
however. Hence, South Korea did engage in some redistributive 
policies. These were less of the welfare type, inasmuch as pure 
transfer programs came rather late in the game in Korea, and 
more of the targeted investment variety, namely, disproportionate 
level of investment in rural areas and in depressed areas. The 
Saemaul Movement was one such program begun in the early 
1970s and continued through the 1980s. Broadly speaking, it 
was a rural modernization and development program, aimed 
at those left behind by urbanization. It was accompanied by 
excessive (over-weighted) investment in provinces such as 
Cholla, known to be lagging. While it is true that some pro-
agricultural policies were distortive and costly, the basic sense 
was that the poorer groups should not be left “too far behind.” 
This is the sense of inclusive growth and it provides lesson 
four, namely, excluded or disadvantaged groups may need 
extra effort, more resources, and special programs to be able 
to benefit from the general societal gains that may elude them.
The fifth basic lesson that has important ramifications for the 
future pattern of economic growth revolves around planning, 
monitoring and evaluation. Beginning with President Park 
Chung-hee, the role of the government in economic planning, 
including Five Year Plans and the coordinating role of the 
Economic Planning Board; the extensive monitoring of export 
production versus national targets and the use of subsidized 
credit to generate export revenue; and the importance placed 
on evaluating the efficacy of policy interventions all led to a 
culture of accountability. Knowing how economic progress is 
occurring, who was left behind, how Korea was stacking up 
versus its competitors, these were all part of the accountability 
culture that enabled policymakers at first and politicians later on 
to track economic progress and the distribution of gains. This is 
not to say that equitable distribution of income was a national 
objective, since it clearly wasn’t, or that Korean elites didn’t 
gain enormous economic power, which they did; but rather to 
argue that the data was always available to show how national 
income was being generated and captured and outlandish gains 
were usually frowned upon and often punished, especially in 
the high growth decades.
It is natural, some would argue, that the distribution of income 
and more so the distribution of wealth will become more 
uneven as countries become richer, and this has been the case 
in Korea as well. Once a certain level of development has 
been achieved, in the case of Korea, joining the OECD or the 
club of advanced economies, greater efforts are needed both 
on the side of active redistribution of income as well as in 
ways to discourage the perpetuation of wealth and the lack of 
opportunity of the average citizen to succeed. This process has 
preoccupied South Korea in the course of the last decade and 
a half. Some efforts have been exerted to show that the elites 
should not dominate; however, these efforts have been weak 
and largely ineffective. They took the form of a ban on private 
tutoring, the closure of the prestigious Kyonggi High School 
that grounded many of Korea’s top academics and bureaucrats, 
a few celebrated corruption cases, debates on tuition and the 
like. Nevertheless, the distribution of income pre-tax and post-
tax is not that different and Korea seems quite a ways from the 
social democratic model of Europe according to OECD data. 
Hence, the sixth and final lesson is that complacency is not 
advisable when dealing with rapidly enriching countries, since 
the accumulation of wealth goes hand-in-hand with the exercise 
of economic power, especially when regulation and institutions 
cannot keep up with the politics of power. In this sense, Korea 
is no different that other OECD countries that have witnessed 
the same pattern of concentrated economic power.
What Next for South Korea?
While Korea’s remarkable economic growth trajectory 
provides many lessons for others seeking to escape poverty 
and maximize their economic potential, unfortunately there 
are fewer countries that can provide lessons to Korea as an 
advanced economy seeking to find a new equilibrium as a just 
and more equal society. Recent years have tended to show 
Korea as rudderless in this new world.
True, Samsung TVs now dominate global consumer preferences 
and Hyundai and Kia are setting new records as cars of choice. 
Still, Korean public sentiment is distinctly unhappy, despite 
per capita incomes of $27,000 and material gains that were 
considered unattainable in 1960 or even 1980. Korea has 
confounded the critics. It lacked the size of a China. It lacked the 
resources of a Malaysia. It lacked the location of a Singapore. 
It didn’t rely on foreign direct investment. It delayed domestic 
consumption until investment needs were accommodated. It 
deferred welfare programs until they were fiscally affordable. 
Korea did so many things well that it has created the impression 
and expectation that the country will always find the correct 
path. In reality, however, Korea now needs to hear new voices 
of advice and needs to generate a new collective view on its 
own future.
Some Policy Suggestions for the Future
It may be presumptuous to offer advice to a country that 
has been so eminently successful. Nevertheless, sometimes, 
outside advice can be useful in clarifying what many know but 
that few can openly articulate. Policymakers long accustomed 
to dealing with long time horizons are now forced by politics 
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to deal with the immediate, situations repeated throughout 
the advanced economies. The long-run planning, monitoring 
and evaluation strengths are eroding and with it better policy 
choices are often ignored. So here are a few possible policy 
lessons to smooth Korea’s future and maintain the great 
strengths and hard-won gains of the past.
Although many may dispute the necessity of continuing to 
generate incremental economic growth, societies’ desires 
for more public goods and better public services as well as 
increasing longevity make economic growth indispensable. 
In the case of Korea, declining fertility and almost absent 
immigration are creating a long-term problem. Capital and 
technology with a declining labor force as now seen in Korea 
leads to lower long-term growth. Moreover, the lower rates 
of total factor productivity seen in services as compared to 
manufactures further lowers potential growth rates. To spur 
future growth, women need to be encouraged to remain in the 
labor force and this requires changes in cultural attitudes, better 
and more affordable child-care and a number of other labor 
market reforms. This is the first priority if Korea is to avoid 
being the next Japan, namely, hamstrung by demographics and 
condemned to eventual economic decline.
Second, household savings have almost disappeared and 
household indebtedness has risen astronomically. While 
the promotion of domestic consumption was once seen as 
a necessary policy to break the total growth dependence on 
exports and investments, it is now a drag on the economy. 
Much of household debt is due to poor mortgage markets 
and short-term, high cost mortgages. Mortgage reform is a 
major priority that requires government action. This is more 
important than becoming a financial center in Asia, and in 
fact, might spur that development. Without mortgage reform, 
consumption will suffer, birth rates will not rebound, and 
public confidence and perceptions will suffer. It is noteworthy 
that Korea ranks poorly on indices of happiness, while 
economic progress has been so astounding positive.
Third, energy policy needs to be reviewed. While public 
transportation investments are excellent, congestion and 
pollution pose significant challenges. It is ironic that Korea is so 
advanced in the export of sustainable energy sources, whether 
wind turbines or the development of electric cars, when, at 
the same time, Korea’s GDP is so energy intensive and so 
carbon-dominated. Thinking of sustainable economic activity 
means that these issues need to be addressed immediately. 
Innovation and other measures cannot substitute for realistic 
energy pricing. There are lessons from Europe that can usefully 
be applied in the realm of energy efficiency. Increasingly we 
are coming to realize that a truly advanced economy is a clean 
economy as well.
Fourth, one cannot ignore issues of income inequality for long. 
Korea has been lucky, as noted earlier in the essay, to generate 
a participatory and shared economic growth model. But that 
model, based on massive employment generation, is fraying. 
Wages have increased in the service sector, now the dominant 
portion of GDP, while productivity is lagging. As costs rise, real 
incomes of the middle class will suffer the same declines seen 
in most OECD economies. At the same time, redistribution 
efforts are not sufficient to offset the natural accumulation of 
wealth, which perpetuate greater inequality and concentration 
of wealth. 
Fifth, there is need for a re-invigoration of institutions that help 
guide and manage the economy and other aspects of society. 
In order to deal with long-run challenges in a non-political 
fashion, institutional reforms are needed. Some countries, 
notably Chile and Singapore, have been able over the years to 
create bi-partisan commissions to deal with issues of pensions, 
health care and other social programs that require long-term 
planning and implementation. Insofar as the set of policy 
priorities now has expanded beyond export diversification 
and macroeconomic management, the role once played by the 
Economic Planning Board needs to be mirrored in many other 
spheres of public policy. Short-term decision-making runs the 
risk of policy reversals and policy expediency. These were 
never characteristics of Korean policymaking in the past.
How to Use Korea’s Legacy Strengths for 
the Future
One of the big advantages of Korea’s economic history is 
that it has accomplished the very difficult and hence is well 
positioned, under the right circumstances, to deal with the 
new set of challenges. Its disadvantage is that given so rapid 
a trajectory, the public does not remember the food shortages, 
57-hour work weeks, and fear of failure of the 1960s. A major 
public relations campaign is needed to re-inculcate Korean 
traditional values. Moreover, Korea’s organizational skills and 
abilities to work across the public and private sectors can be 
mobilized to deal with the challenges of the 2015-2030 period.
In order to bring public and private priorities into better sync, 
corporate governance reform would seem important. Whereas 
government used to be the financier of the private sector, the 
shoe is now on the other foot and the corporate sector needs to 
align its growth and profit motives with other aspect of societal 
polices. To give a prime example, take the role of women in 
Korean corporations. Wage differentials are enormous, the 
glass ceiling for women is absolute, and talented women are 
forced into their own businesses or into low-paying jobs. 
Advancement is limited and marriage and child-rearing are 
impossible to reconcile with corporate responsibilities. One 
 OVERVIEW AND MACROECONOMIC ISSUES - 5
need only look at public and corporate policies in countries like 
Sweden to see how incentives can help maintain birth rates and 
provide for a more gender equitable and harmonious society. 
A national program involving the chaebol, public sector 
entities and non-governmental actors should be launched. The 
same drive that was once given to exports should be aimed at 
producing larger Korean families.
Energy pricing is another “low-hanging fruit.” Korea could 
be a leader in electric car manufacturing for its own national 
market. It has the technology. It has a superb transportation 
grid. It has public support for energy efficient solutions, yet 
it has a paltry record in terms of sustainable energy policy. 
Again a public-private effort is required, with carrots and 
sticks, to make major changes in energy usage. There may be 
an issue of equity involved as well, but congestion taxes on the 
wealthy that help finance major new energy investments and 
cross subsidies can encourage smarter energy choices. Not 
only is this do-able, it is also a long-run, pro-growth policy.
The creation of a public agency to manage long-term 
investments should be a priority. It needs to be set above 
political influence. The roles of the Bank of Korea and of the 
Competition Commission also need strengthening to ensure 
their independence across political cycles. These independent 
entities can ensure greater institutional strength and they can 
garner public support if they are seen as being apolitical. Many 
of the long-standing policy challenges have been recognized 
by Korean thinkers and academics, but haven’t been dealt 
with because of political considerations. The big strength of 
Korean policymaking in the past was its ability to create a 
long-term vision accompanied by long-term planning and solid 
implementation. These virtues could serve Korea well as it 
attempts to deal with its current set of challenges.
Conclusions
There are many areas of economic policy in which Korea set 
the standard in the course of four decades, 1960-2000. During 
that period, incomes per capita snowballed and Korea went 
from a manufacturer of the lowest value-added products to the 
global leader in electronics, appliances and automobiles. No 
other country in the course of the last half-century has done 
as well and even China’s remarkable rise does not detract 
from the Korean success story because of China’s size and the 
unusual and predominant role of state capitalism. In the case 
of Korea, government was able to use the state to create world-
class private global corporations and then to withdraw into 
a more traditional regulatory role. Among OECD countries, 
Korea stands out as the prime exemplar of a state-incentivized 
growth strategy leading to unbelievably rapid increases in per 
capita income.
Korea was a global leader in the use of think tanks and 
economic information. Of course, each corporation now boasts 
its own economic research group; however, the role of the 
Korea Development Institute and of the economic leaders that 
it spawned still stands out today. Being able to adapt the best of 
economic thinking into practical and usable policy advice that 
could work in Korea was a remarkable feat. This strength still 
exists; however, now national expertise needs to be blended 
with global knowledge in ways that may seem unfamiliar to 
Korean policymakers. The efficient use of international experts 
to bring in fresh perspectives may add value to decision-making 
in the 21st century.
Public policy in Korea was managed by a coterie of officials who 
were empowered to do national service, respected, and perhaps 
feared at times, since they commanded such political support. 
This kind of power can be misused, and in some instances it 
was, but overall, Korea stands out among a handful of countries 
in which public policy was well executed and successful. At 
times controversial, or excessive, such as in the heavy and 
chemical industry phase of industrial policy promotion in the 
1980s, public policy was nevertheless well coordinated and 
efficiently executed with a common understanding among all 
the economic agents involved as to what the ultimate goal was. 
The Korean proverb of always “camping with your back to 
the water” was an indication that failure was not an acceptable 
outcome. History has shown that success was the ultimate 
judge of Korea’s efforts, and it can remain so going forward.
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